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Our paper investigates the size and development of the informal sector in Nepal using aggregate 
data over the period 1991 to 2009. Our estimation using the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC) model shows that the average size of the informal sector has been about 44%. Nepal has 
been classified as having a hybrid political regime, so we show the effect that autocracy and 
democracy has had on the growth of the informal sector. Our results shows that a high degree of 
autocracy reduced the size of the informal sector by about 2% while greater direct democracy 
reduced the informal sector by about 10%. 
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Our paper aims to achieve two objectives: First we estimate the size of the informal 
sector (IS) in Nepal using the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model. Figure 
1 shows that the size of the informal sector in Nepal is among the largest in Asia. 
Secondly, we attempt to analyse the effect that autocracy and democracy has had on the 
size of the informal sector. 
 
FIGURE 1. THE INFORMAL SECTOR AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP  
 
Source: Schneider (2002). 
Notes: This figure shows the size of the size of informal sector for a selection of Asian 








Nepal offers a unique opportunity to study this phenomenon because it has 
transitioned from an autocratic rule to a democratic rule.  According to the democracy 
index constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Nepal is classified as a hybrid 
regime. Hybrid regimes refer to political regimes that have serious weaknesses in the 
functioning of government and political parties, substantial irregularities in elections, 
weak rule of law and civil society and harassment of the media. Table 1 shows that 
between 2006 and 2010, Nepal experienced an improvement in the level of democracy 
but no further improvement since 2010. The reason for this stagnation may be linked to 
the fact that people in Nepal have yet to experience the sense of empowerment, 
ownership and responsibility that comes with democracy1. 
 
TABLE 1. THE DEMOCRACY INDEX IN NEPAL 
 
Year 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 
Index 3.42 4.05 4.24 4.24 4.16 
 
Source: Democracy Index 2013, Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 
Frey’s theory of democratic economic policy suggests there could be a causal 
relationship between the freedom of political choice and the size of the informal sector. If 
voters believe that they do not have the power to exercise their political choice, they will 
exit the political system and join the informal sector as a consequence2. Using Granger-
Causality tests, we examine if there is a causal relationship between the freedom of 
political choice and the size of the informal sector in Nepal. Table 2 shows that we do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the freedom of political choice does not granger cause the 
size of the informal sector3. In other words, the causality runs one way from freedom of 
political choice4 to the size of the informal sector. This indicates a close link between 
democracy and the size of the informal sector. 
 
TABLE2. TESTS FOR GRANGER CAUSALITY 
 
Null Hypothesis Obs F-statistic P-value 
Size of the Informal Sector does not 
Granger Cause Freedom of Political 
Choice 
16 1.418 0.300 
Freedom of Political Choice does not 
Granger Cause the Size of the 
Informal Sector. 
16 3.579 0.0597* 
 
* - 10% significance level,  **-5% significance level, ***- 1% significance level. 
Notes: This table presents granger-causality tests between the estimates of the size of the informal 
sector for Nepal and the Freedom of Political Choice. Tests were carried out using Eviews. 
 
For this reason, we develop a model to analyze the effect of democratic and 
autocratic regimes on the size of the informal economy because this sector makes a vital 
contribution to production, employment and consumption in Nepal. The rest of the paper 
is organized in the following manner: Section 2 summarizes key literature on the 
definition of the informal sector and its measurement, reviews key contributions on the 
impact of political regimes, and an overview of the informal economy in Nepal. Section 3 








autocracy and democracy to the size of the informal sector. In Section 4 we specify the 
estimation methodology and the data used in the analysis. The size of the informal sector 
is estimated using the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model between 1991 
to 2009. The first subsection of section 5 presents the MMIC’s model estimates of the 
informal sector in Nepal as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  In the 
second subsection, these estimates are used in an OLS model to empirically investigate 
the impact of autocratic and democratic political regimes on the size of the informal 
sector. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
The informal sector has been characterized by many definitions and descriptions. Some 
definitions characterize the informal sector in terms of its absence from national 
accounts. For instance, Bhattacharya (1999) describes the informal sector as the 
difference between the potential national income for the given currency in 
circulation and the recorded national income. Schneider (20003) defines the 
informal sector as “…all currently unregistered economic activities which contribute to 
the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product”. Other definitions 
characterize the informal sector as being outside the reach of different levels and 
mechanisms of official governance. Feige (1990) and Loayza (1997) describe the 
informal economy as economic actors who operate to circumvent institutional rules. 
Ostrom et al. (2006) characterize the informal sector in terms of operating outside 
the legal framework. In this paper, we follow the definition of the former in 
describing the informal sector.  
A number of attempts have been made to measure the size of the informal 
sector at the macroeconomic level. Two of the commonest approaches that have 
been applied are the currency demand and Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC) models respectively. Tanzi(1983) used the currency demand model to 
estimate the size of the informal sector in the U.S. owing to growing concerns that 
official recordings were not a good fit for the true developments in the economy. Tanzi 
estimated a currency demand model as a function of factors which are linked to the 
increase in the size of the informal sector. Some of these factors include tax burden and 
government regulation. The idea being that an increase in tax burden for example 
increases the incentive to operate in the informal sector and increases the demand for 
currency. Therefore the increase in the demand for currency becomes an indicator for the 
size of the informal sector.   
The MIMIC model was developed by Joreskorg and Goldberger (1975) and uses 
multiple causes and multiple indicators in a simultaneous equations model to estimate an 
unknown variable that cannot be measured directly. The informal sector is estimated as a 
reduced form equation which expresses the indicators as a function of the causes. A 
benchmarking procedure is used to generate time series estimates of the size of the 
informal sector as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National 
Product (GNP) or the labour force. Bajada and Schneider (2002) applied the MIMIC 
model and currency demand model to estimate the size of the informal economy for 
eighteen Asia-Pacific countries to generate estimates for the year 1989-1990. Their 
results showed a great deal of similarity between the two estimates. Among their results, 
Thailand (51.9%) had by far the largest informal economy followed by Srilanka (43.7%), 
Philippines (42.6%) and Nepal (37.4%). On the other hand, Singapore and Japan had the 








et al. (2006) applied the MIMIC model to estimate the size of the informal sector for 
India as a whole and on a State by State basis. They estimated the size of the informal 
sector for India to be 20.3% of GDP between 1994/5. As part of their estimation, they 
compared the size of the informal sector in India with major economies in the Asia-
Pacific for the same period. Their results concurred with Bajada and Schneider (2002) 
that Thailand had the largest informal sector while Japan had the smallest informal sector 
among the Asia-Pacific countries. 
 
A Short Literature Review on the Effects of  
Political Regimes 
 
According to Teobaldelli and Schneider (2012), direct democracy enables citizens to 
“voice out” their opinions on government performance. They showed using evidence 
drawn from 57 democracies that higher levels of direct democracy through referendums 
causes a decrease in the incentive to operate in the informal sector. The presence of an 
inverse relationship between direct democracy and the size of the informal sector is also 
supported by Thieen (2010). The study was carried out on a sample of thirty-eight 
OECD countries including eight eastern European countries. In this study, direct 
democracy was included in order to take into account the role of behavioural theories. 
Furthermore, previous studies had not included measures of direct democracy in a cross-
section panel. The empirical study used variables such as democratic accountability, 
efficiency of the legal framework and impartial courts to measure direct democracy. 
These variables showed that better democratic accountability, more efficient legal 
frameworks and impartial courts contribute to reducing the size of the informal sector. 
These are the few studies that have attempted to show the relationship between direct 
democracy and the size of the informal sector. 
Other studies by Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Frey (1994), Matsusaka 
(1995, 2005) showed that there is a link between direct democracy and fiscal policy. Feld 
and Kirchgässner (2001) showed that among Swiss municipalities, budget referendums 
led to a reduction in public expenditure per capita. Also Matsusaka (1995, 2005) showed 
that democratic participation lead to a decrease in tax burden as well as a decrease in state 
and local government expenditure. Finally, Torgler (2005) showed using evidence from 
Switzerland that direct democracy increases tax morale. The use of taxes is not 
exclusive to democratic regimes. Cheibub (1998) discusses the various hypotheses 
on the relationships between taxation and political regimes. He identifies a 
hypothesis which suggests that democracies tend to tax more and grow less than 
authoritarian regimes. His empirical results show that after controlling for 
counterfactuals in countries experiences, the type of political regime has no impact 
on the level of taxation.  
In Hausken et al. (2004), there is a u-shaped relationship between the level of 
democracy and the size of government spending. At low levels of democracy, the 
government chooses rents to maintain political support however public spending 
increases at higher levels of democracy with a tendency to over-invest. Theoretical 
models on non-democratic regimes tend to use rents rather than taxes as the use of rents 
enables the government to exploit their monopoly power by restricting access to inputs or 
markets for private benefits. Emerson (2006) highlights the fact that early studies on 
corruption used models where government agents engaged in rent seeking behaviour in 
order to control access to formal markets. This provided an incentive to demand bribes 
thereby stifling competition in the formal market. Paltseva (2010) captures the degree of 








behaviour in order to expropriate capital for private benefits. As a result growth depends 
on the extent to which the regime wishes to cling to power.  
 In our model, we use taxes to model the effect of direct democracy and 
rents to model the effect of autocracy. Although, it is true that taxes and rents are 
not necessarily particular to any type of government, democracy is about choice 
while autocracy signifies a lack of choice. We use taxes to show that the agent can 
choose not to pay tax by operating in the informal sector. This makes taxes a natural 
choice for modelling the effect of direct democracy. However, in an autocracy the 
agent cannot voice-out opposition to the government because he cannot avoid to 
pay rent on investment. The government expropriates a proportion of investment 
before the agent begins production. 
 More recent studies have examined the links between political regimes and 
growth or pro-growth policies. Saha (2011) showed that there is a relationship 
between democracy measured using legislative institutions, poverty and growth. 
The main thrust of the paper is that democracies lead to an increase in pro-poor 
expenditure leading to reduction in poverty and by implication an increase in 
growth. This is because parliamentary competition from other parties compel a 
government to pay attention to alternative policies. Examples of parliamentary 
competition could be proposals to increase health and education or pressures to 
implement pro-poor policies during times of re-election. Their finding is also 
supported by Blaydes and Kaser (2011) who show empirically that in developing 
countries, democratic institutions can interact with growth in such a way that it 
contributes to poverty reduction.  
  Finally, Knutsen (2013) shows that relationship between the type of political 
regime and state capacity can have different implications for growth in African 
countries. The state capacity is defined as the ability to “implement official goals 
over the actions or potential opposition of powerful social groups” According to 
Knutsen, democracy increases growth when the state capacity is weak. This is 
because democracy is a substitute for weak state capacity. In the presence of weak 
state institutions, democracies put some constraints on political leaders thereby 
placing pressure on them to choose policies that are popular with the electorate. 
Consequently, this leads to economic development and growth.  
 
The Informal Sector in Nepal 
 
According to Suwal and Pant (2009), the informal sector employs about 96% of the 
economically active population and contributes over 50% to the national economy. The 
structure of the Nepalese economy is characterized by an artery of formal and informal 
activities that are linked through subcontracting networks and commodity chains. The 
informal sector has expanded over recent years owing to the presence of various taxes 
that poses barriers to small and medium scale enterprises respectively. For example, Pohit 
and Taneja (2000) point out that the use of certain tariff and non-tariff barriers prompted 
a large amount of informal trade from Nepal to India. Some of the consequences of the 
expanding informal sector are that those who work in the informal sector often become 
marginalized from the development agenda. They become excluded from social security, 
institutional or empowerment rights and many other forms of policy support (Timalsina, 
2011). Although the informal sector contributes to development by providing 








in  tax revenue that could be invested in public capital thereby hampering growth and 
development (Barro, 1990).   
The relationship between policy stakeholders and the informal economy has 
been mostly unconstructive. For instance, the government of Nepal restricts legislative or 
financial support to informal workers (who are mostly the poor in Nepal). Also, the 
subsidy policy mainly in agriculture which has a direct influence on self-employed 
workers in the informal sector is mostly captured by the social elite. Consequently, few or 
none of the poor public benefit from the agricultural subsidy (ILO, 2004). 
As a result, (Dahal, 2011) suggests that the growing democratic processes 
pioneered by the state and trade unions need to integrate the informal sector in to the 
social security system because the informal sector equally contributes to the national 
economy as well as mediates between the citizen and the State. This will ensure that 
informal sector workers are not marginalized and prevent the abuse of their civil liberties 
 
THE MODEL  
 
In this section, we adapt the model by Solomon (2011) to analyze the effect of  
democracy and autocracy on the size of the informal sector. The model is modified in two 
significant ways: first we assume full depreciation of physical capital stock and public 
capital stock. Secondly we assume that the government is a benevolent autocrat. Easterly 
(2011) defines a benevolent autocrat as a “non-democratic leader who receives credit for 
growth”. The government is a benevolent autocrat because it cares about growth in the 
formal sector and not just about maximizing its revenue from taxes in order to cling onto 
power. 
Consider a small closed economy that consists of an infinitely lived agent, two 
sectors- formal, informal and a Government. The government can separate its power into 
two dimensions: autocracy and democracy. The agent is endowed with capital stock and 
is assumed to be both a consumer and a producer. There are no firms in the model. 
Furthermore, we assume that the informal sector is less capital intensive than the formal 
sector and labour supply is fixed. 
The agent invests capital stock in both the formal sector (FS) and the informal 
sector (IFS). The difference between the FS and IFS is that output in the FS is taxed 
while output in the IFS is not taxed because its production is unobserved by the 
government. The IFS is also characterized by three other features: all output produced is 
consumed, output is not used for capital accumulation and the informal sector faces 
barriers to political and economic participation5. The agent chooses next periods capital 
stock in the formal and informal sectors to maximize his expected discounted value of 
utility subject to his budget constraint and the evolution of capital stock in the formal 
sector. 
  We assume that the government can separate its power into an autocracy and a 
democracy. Our basis for this assumption comes from Brown and Saving (1999) who 
show that the kind of power a government exercises has an impact on the demand for its 
services. Direct democracy is exercised according to the Lindahl rule which is used to 
make decisions on how much public good is provided. In this set-up, each taxpayer can 
vote on the amount of public good provision that would maximize his utility. This means 
implicitly that the government considers agent’s decisions in setting the tax rate. 
Government spends a proportion of tax revenue on public capital while the rest is used to 
finance its own consumption. The more the government considers the decisions of votes 
in the provision of public goods, the lower the tax rate. Therefore the tax rate becomes 








On the other hand, the government has the incentive to extract the maximum 
surplus from the agent by restricting the amount of input available to the agent for 
production and investment. Therefore, it can charge a monopoly rent on any input6.  The 
government exercises its autocratic power by charging a monopoly rent on investment in 
capital stock for private benefits. The greater the amount of private benefits, the greater 
the incentive for the government to expropriate investment through higher rent so as to 
hold on to power (Paltseva, 2010). Given that the government is a benevolent autocrat, 
we assume that private benefits to holding on to power are small because the economy is 
resource poor.  Consequently, the rent becomes our proxy for the level of autocracy.  
The agent begins the period with public capital stock (Xt) and capital stock (kt). 
To the agent, public capital stock is exogenous, as well as the tax rate (  and  monopoly 
rent on investment in the FS. The government spends the tax revenue obtained from 
production in the FS to accumulate public capital stock and finance its own consumption. 
We assume that the government balances its budget every period. Equation (1) expresses 
the agent’s preferences which is derived from consuming goods from the FS and IFS. 
Equations (2) and (3) are the production functions in the formal and informal sector 
respectively. The agent produces output using capital stock and public capital stock. 
Equation (4) expresses capital stock as the sum of capital stock in the FS (k1t) and IFS 
(k2t). Equation (5) describes the evolution of capital stock. The accumulation of capital 
stock depends on the pay-off to the government from expropriating investment (Dt) 
shown in (6). The pay-off to the government is revenue from monopoly rent on 
investment less the cost of collecting the rent () plus private benefits (b). From equations 
(5) and (6), it is clear that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in the FS and IS 
depends on the extent to which the government is willing to cling onto power i.e. the 
degree of autocracy.  Equation (7) describes the evolution of public capital stock where 
we assume full depreciation of capital stock. It shows that public capital stock next period 
is produced from public investment where  represents the proportion of tax 
revenue used for public investment7. Finally, equation (8) is the agent’s total budget 
constraint and shows that aggregate output is the sum of aggregate consumption in both 
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First Order Conditions 
 
In this section, the model is solved according to the dynamic programming approach 
developed by Bellman (1957). The agent’s objective is to choose the level of 
consumption in the FS (c1t) and IFS (c2t) that maximizes utility. However, c1t and c2t is 
solved in terms of next period’s capital stock in the FS and IFS (k1t+1, k2t+1). This is 
because investment links consumption today with consumption in the next period. The 
agent chooses next period’s capital stock in the formal and informal sectors i.e.  k1t+1, 
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 The Euler equations of the model as a result of the agent choosing capital stock 
in the FS and IFS are presented below in (10) and (11). They show the agent’s time-
allocation trade-off in the marginal utility consumption. Each equation shows that a 
reduction in the marginal utility consumption in time t equals the expected marginal 
benefit of increasing consumption discounted at . The increase in consumption is the 
result of capital accumulation from investment of physical capital and public capital 
stocks respectively.  
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cU     (11) 
 
Each period the agents equates the after-tax marginal productivity of capital 
stock in the FS to the marginal product of capital stock in the IFS. This is shown in (12) 
below: 
 




















XkA    (12) 
           
Therefore an increase in tax reduces the accumulation of capital stock in the FS relative 
to the IFS as the economy converges towards steady state.   
Steady-State Solutions 
 
In this section, we derive the steady-state solutions to capital stock in the FS and IFS, 
public capital stock and the relative size of the informal sector. The time subscripts in 
(10) and (11) are set to zero in order to solve steady-state capital stock in the FS  





























































































































AX ss       (15) 
 
An increase in the tax rate decreases the marginal product of capital stock in the 
FS relative to the IFS. Consequently, the agent accumulates more capital stock in the IFS 
and this increases the relative size of the informal sector as the economy converges 
towards steady state. On the other hand, an increase in rent on investment decreases the 
accumulation of capital stock in both the FS and IFS. As the IFS is less capital intensive, 
the relative size of the informal sector decreases as the economy converges towards the 
steady-state. Equation (16) shows that the relative size of the informal sector (I) is 
defined as the ratio of steady-state output in the IFS relative to the FS. 
 


















       (16)                    
Calibration  
 
In this section, we calibrate the parameters to examine the impact of tax and monopoly 
rent respectively on I. This is because the steady-state solutions are extremely non-linear. 
The parameters are calibrated to match the average estimated size of the informal sector 
in Nepal between 1990-20108.  According to our estimates using the MIMIC model, this 
was found to be 37.17% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
The capital share parameter in the FS,  and the discount factor  are set to 0.33 
and 0.96 respectively9. The capital share parameter in the IFS,  , is set to one-tenth the 
share in the FS. The barriers to economic and political participation,   is set according to 
an index of institutionalized autocracy. This index is obtained from the Quality of 
Governance (QOG) institute10. The higher the index, the higher the level of autocracy. 
As a result,  is set to 2.00 to reflect the current level of autocracy in Nepal.  The tax 








rent on capital stock,   is also set to 0.30 in order to compare it with the effect of 
increasing the tax rate on the relative size of the informal sector. Setting values for the 
share of public capital stock in the FS and IS  and the proportion of tax revenue 
spent on public investment  are the most challenging because there are no direct 
measures for Nepal. As a result, these parameters are set to 0.05, 0.474 and 0.3 
respectively to match the average estimated size of the IS in Nepal.  
Policy Experiments 
 
Table 3 compares the effect of increasing the tax rate with monopoly rent on I in the 
steady-state. We start by increasing the tax rate, holding the monopoly rent at the 
calibrated level. The second row shows that increasing the tax rate, increases the relative 
size of the informal sector.  
 Next, we increase monopoly rent, holding the tax rate at the calibrated level. 
The last row shows that increasing the rent decreases the relative size of the informal 
sector. The higher the tax rate, the less the government allows the agent to decide on the 
tax rate. This is because it cares less about growth in the FS relative to maximizing tax 
revenues. An increase in the tax rate (lower direct democracy) means that the government 
does not care much about the decision of the agent (voter). Consequently, the agent has 
less of a voice over the amount of resources that can be allocated towards consumption 
and investment. As the marginal returns to production in the FS decreases relative to the 
IFS, our policy experiment shows that the agent can choose to freely exit into the 
informal sector as a voice-out or vote against the democratic process. Therefore, the size 
of the informal sector is indirectly proportional to the level of democracy. In other words, 
lower direct democracy increases the size of the informal sector. On the other hand, the 
higher the monopoly rent (higher autocracy) charged on investment, the greater the 
government’s control over the agent’s ability accumulate capital stock next period for 
production in both sectors. An increase in monopoly rent the amount of capital stock 
available for production. Consequently, the marginal returns to production in the IFS 
decreases by a larger magnitude relative to the FS because the IFS depends on the FS for 
investment. Therefore greater autocracy decreases the size of the informal sector.  
 
 
TABLE 3.  EFFECT OF INCREASING THE TAX RATE VS. MONOPOLY 
RENTS ON THE SIZE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
  
Tax rate  0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 
 I 0.23 0.34 0.48 0.66 0.93 1.38 
Rent (r)  0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 
I 0.47 0.42 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.33 
We now turn to discuss the estimation of the informal sector for Nepal using the 
MIMIC model. This is subsequently followed by a discussion of the data and the 
construction of the time series estimates of the size of the informal sector. These 
estimates will be used to empirically test the impact of   democracy and autocracy on the 








ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY  
 
The MIMIC model was developed by Joreskorg and Goldberger (1975) as an approach to 
estimating an unobserved variable. Equation (17) is a structural equation showing that the 
unobserved variable 
*
ty  is a function of  tx   observable exogenous causes subject to a 
structural error term t .  
 
      ttt xy 
*
        (17) 
 
where  cttct xxx ,...,1  is a column vector of  c  exogenous causes and  is a  c1  
row vector of structural parameters. Equation (18) is a measurement equation and shows 
that 
*
ty  is determined by a set of  observable endogenous indicators subject to a set of 
measurement error
 ',...,1 dtt uu .  
   
ttt uyy 
*
         (18)        
 
Where, 
)',...,( 1 dttt yyy   is a column vector of d observed indicators and 
)',...,( 1 dttt uuu  of d measurement errors. Finally,  is a d x 1 column vector of 




The general properties of the structural model are that all variables are assumed 
to have zero expectations. The structural error term has zero expectation, a constant 
variance  2  and is independent of tx . For the measurement model, the error terms 
also have zero expectations. The measurement error terms are assumed to be independent 
of each other
11
. Finally for tu , d , is a dd   diagonal covariance matrix and contains 
 which are the vector of variances along the leading diagonal. These general properties 
of the structural and measurement models are formalized below: 
 
         iuttttttt diaguuEEuExE   ,,0,,0, 22'  
 Identification 
The structural parameters to be estimated are  , , 2 , . In order to uniquely identify 
these structural parameters, we obtain a reduced form solution because 
*
ty cannot be 
estimated directly. From (17) and (18) we obtain the following reduced form solution that 
expresses the observable indicators as a function of the exogenous causes. 
 









where   is a  dc  coefficient matrix and tv is the disturbance vector given as 
tt u . From tv  we then obtain the reduced form covariance matrix shown below in 
(20). 
 
                                          uttvvE  '2'      (20) 
 
From the reduced form model, there are cd elements contained in  , one element  
contained in the variance of  and 
2
)1( dd




elements   contained in the variance of xt. The total number of reduced form parameters 











cd . From the structural model, there are c  




contained in the variance of tx . Furthermore, there are d  elements in   and d  
elements contained in the variance of  .  As a result, the total number of structural 







cd .  
The necessary condition for identification is that the number of reduced form 
parameters should be equal to the number of structural parameters. Therefore, the total 
number of parameters needed to just identify the model comes from subtracting S’ from S 
as shown below in (21)    
 







cdSS    (21) 
 
From (21), it can be shown that we need two indicators and two exogenous causes to just-
identify the structural model 
A sufficient condition is required in order to identify unique solutions to the 
structural parameters  and ' . This is because the product of   and '  remains the 
same  is multiplied by a scalar and '  is divided by the same scalar. Therefore to 
resolve this identification problem, the unobserved variable is normalized by setting one 
of the coefficients in the column matrix of '  to a constant. One way of achieving this is 
to fix the coefficient of one of the indicators to one to allow for ease of economic 
interpretation12. In our paper, the coefficient of narrow money is fixed to one. This 
implies that the trend in narrow money is indicative of the size and development of the 
informal sector in Nepal. 
Data 
 
In this section, we describe the variables used to estimate the size of the informal sector 








to the availability of data. For the causes we use variables such as the revenue from direct 
tax as a percentage of GDP, inflation rate and the empowerment rights index as a proxy 
for the burden of government regulation. For the indicators, the variables we use are real 
gross domestic product (GDP), labor force participation rates and broad money (M2). 
Table 4 shows for each variable the a-priory relationship with the size of informal 
economy.  
 
TABLE 4.  A-PRIORY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CAUSAL AND 
INDICATOR VARIABLES AND INFORMAL ECONOMY 
 
Our motivation for our choice of causal variables are as follows: An increase in 
the tax rate provides a strong incentive to work in informal economy. This is because it 
reduces the after-tax profit from production. Consequently, people shift their capital and 
labour towards production in the informal sector in order to avoid paying tax. The effect 
of the inflation rate on the size of the informal sector is rather ambiguous. On the one 
hand, higher inflation can have a positive impact on the size of the informal sector as 
people on low income switch to the informal sector for the purchase of goods and 
services which are relatively cheaper. However, the effect can also be negative because 
inflation acts as tax on the informal economy which is mainly cash driven13.  
Finally, the Labor empowerment rights index is an additive index constructed 
from summing the following indices: foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers’ rights, electoral self-
determination, and freedom of religion. The index ranges from 0 (no government respect 
for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights). This 
qualitative information is a useful measure of the effect of government regulation on the 
labour force. A low number is a reflection of the level of dis-satisfaction that government 
regulation has among the labour force. Therefore we expect a negative relationship 
between the labor empowerment rights index and the size of the informal sector. 
Real GDP is a measure of the value of output adjusted for inflation. The 
relationship between real GDP and the size of the informal sector as far as the literature is 
concerned is ambiguous. On the one hand, there can be a negative relationship between 
Real GDP and the size of the informal economy because during periods of recession, 
there is a greater demand for goods and services supplied by the informal sector. On the 
other hand, there can be a positive relationship because higher demand in formal sector 
spills over into the informal sector who depend on the formal sector for the supply of 
inputs.  
Causal Variables A-Priory Relationship 
1. Tax Revenue Positive 
2. Inflation rate Positive/Negative 
3. Empowerment Rights Index Negative 
Indicator Variables  
4. Labor Participation Rate Negative 
5. Real GDP Negative 








Finally, narrow money (M1) indicates the amount of cash held by public. The 
expansion of shadow economy leads to the growth of narrow money held by the public in 
comparison to the demand deposits because the transactions are assumed to be made in 
cash payments so that the clandestine activities are undetected by the authorities. 
Consequently, M1 will be used to indicate the development of the size of the informal 




This section is divided into two parts: Section 5.1 reports the results of the MIMIC 
models and presents the estimates of the size of the informal sector in Nepal from 1991 to 
2009. Section 5.2 presents the empirical analysis of the impact of political regimes (direct 
democracy and autocracy) on the size of the informal sector. 
 
The MIMIC’s Model Estimates of the Informal Sector in Nepal 
 
The size of the informal sector is estimated as a restricted linear function of structural 
coefficients according to equation (22). The ordinal index comes from the fitted values 
which are obtained by multiplying the structural coefficients. It is this index which is 
converted to a cardinal measures of the informal sector as a proportion of GDP. The data 
were filtered for stationarity by taking first differences.  
 
ttttt xcxcxcy  313212111
* ˆˆˆˆ       (22) 
Table 5 reports the results of the MIMIC model. The p-values are reported in the 
parenthesis. The model consists of two indicators and four causes which means from 
equation (20) that our model is over-identified by two additional parameters. We focus on 
the sign as well as the significance of the parameters. However, what is most crucial is 
that we do not reject the null hypothesis that the model is over-identified. Among the 
indicators, the coefficient of M1 has been fixed to 1 to sufficiently identify the model. 
Our results show that real GDP has a positive and significant impact on the size of 
informal sector at the 10% level. This suggests that in Nepal there is a direct relationship 
between formal sector and informal sector.  Among the causes, the results show that tax 
and inflation have a positive and significant effect on the informal sector at the 5% and 
1%  levels of significance respectively. Finally the labour empowerment rights index has 
a negative and insignificant effect on the size of the informal sector. The sign of this 
variable is different from a-priori expectations and could reflect the unconstructive 
relationship between the informal sector and policy stakeholders (policy makers and trade 













TABLE 5. MIMIC MODEL’S ESTIMATES 
Indicators  
Annual Growth in Narrow Money 1.00 
Annual Growth in Real GDP 0.24(1.92)*** 
Causes  
Annual Growth in Tax Revenue 0.326(2.83)** 
Labour Empowerment Rights 0.005(1.07) 
 
Inflation 0.004(1.83)*** 
Diagnostic Results  
Chi-square(2) 0.30(0.8620) 
Root Mean Square 0.021 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit (AGOF)                                                                                   
0.714 
  
* - 10% significance level, **-5% significance level, ***- 1% significance level. 
 Next we turn to the diagnostics, table 5 shows that we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that our model is over-identified by the additional two parameters. The Root 
Mean Standard Error of Approximation (RMSEA) measures the discrepancy between the 
sample and estimated covariance matrices. An RMSEA of < 0.5 shows that the model is a 
good fit. Our results shows a small discrepancy of 0.021 indicating that the model is a 
good fit of the data. Finally, the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) indicates how 
well the model fits the data. The index ranges between 0 and 1. Table 5 shows that AGFI 
index is 0.714 demonstrating that our model is a good fit of the data. 
 The index is then converted to a cardinal measure of the informal sector by 
scaling up the series using an exogenous estimate that comes from outside the model. The 
index is scaled to take a value of 37.4% of GDP in 2000. This exogenous estimate 
represents the estimated growth of the size of the informal sector between 2000 and 2001 
and was obtained by Bajada and Schneider (2003). The rest of the series is adjusted by 
the value of this scale such that the series passes through a base value of 37.4% of GDP 
in 2000. The time series estimates of the size of the informal sector are reported in Table 










TABLE 6. TIME SERIES ESTIMATES OF THE GROWTH OF THE SIZE OF 
THE  INFORMAL SECTOR IN NEPAL  
 
FIGURE 2: MIMIC MODEL ESTIMATES OF THE GROWTH OF THE 




Notes: This figures shows estimates of the size of the Informal Sector for Nepal between 1991to 
2010 based on the MIMIC model. Estimation was carried out using STATA. 
 Analyzing the Impact of Political Regimes on the Size of the Informal Sector  
 
The thrust of our empirical investigation is to estimate the impact of  two political 
regimes: democracy and autocracy on the size of the informal sector in Nepal. As 
previously indicated, the sample period for the estimation is restricted to the period 
between 1991 to 2009.  This was due to our inability to obtain sufficient time series data 
after 2009. 
 Equation (23) presents the baseline model for estimating the impact of 
democracy and autocracy on the size of the informal sector for Nepal. The model is an 
adaptation of the empirical model from Teobaldelli and Schneider (2012) who estimated 
Year % of GDP Year % of GDP 
1991 33.9 2000 37.4 
1992 67.6 2001 39.7 
1993 53.1 2002 12.7 
1994 65.9 2003 32.7 
1995 69.3 2004 38.6 
1996 36.8 2005 25.4 
1997 44.0 2006 23.9 
1998 42.7 2007 46.1 
1999 43.4 2008 42.1 








the effect of direct democracy on the size of the informal sector. INFt is the estimated size 









   (23) 
 
The data was taken from the Quality of Government (QOG) institute prepared 
by the University of Gothenburg, Sweden14. The first variable is ciri_elecsd which 
measures the freedom of political choice in order to measure direct democracy. This 
measures the extent to which people have the political freedom to change laws or the 
officials that govern them through free and fair elections. The scale is from 0 to 2 where 0 
is no right to self-determination through free and fair elections and 2 is where political 
participation is very free and open. The second variable is p_autoc which measures the 
level of institutionalized autocracy defined broadly in terms of the level of political 
participation. We include this variable to measure the impact of autocracy/democracy on 
the size of the informal sector. The scale ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 is low degree of 
autocracy and 10 refers to a high degree of autocracy. The third variable pwt_gsg 
measures Government share as a percentage of GDP. This is included to proxy for the 
size of government. In order to reduce the problem of omitted variable bias we run a 
number of regressions using additional control variables such as unna_grgdp (growth rate 
of real GDP), education (number of years spent in secondary school), emp_rights (labour 
rights) and pwt_open (trade openness).   
 Table 7 presents summary statistics of all the data employed in this study. The 
average estimate of the size of the informal sector for the sample period is given as 
40.6% of GDP.  Our results show that there is a lot of variation in the estimates as the 
largest estimated size of the informal sector was 69.4% of GDP in 1995 while the 
smallest was approximately 12.7% of GDP in 2002. The average share of government 
expenditure was approximately 17% of GDP during the sample period.  
 
TABLE 7. SUMMARY STATISTICS  




Mean 44.10 17.21 1.714 4.43 7.58 50.99 1.57 
Maximum 69.40 18.51 7.00 8.22 10.00 67.45 2.00 
Minimum 12.70 15.20 0.00 0.12 4.00 36.44 0.00 
Standard 
Deviation 
15.50 0.97 0.99 1.89 1.64 8.31 0.65 
Turning to the indices measuring autocracy and direct democracy, our data 
shows that in Nepal the government has transitioned from autocracy to democracy. 
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly more democratic relative to its past. However, 
the table clearly shows that during its political history, Nepal has experienced a high 
degree of autocracy. The maximum and minimum statistics show that that the level of 
autocracy was highest in 2004. Table 8 shows granger causality tests between ciri_elecsd 
and p_autoc respectively and the size of the informal sector  
in Nepal. The results shows that direct democracy granger causes the size of the informal 








the informal sector and vice versa. This indicates the absence of reverse causality among 
the variables, reducing the risk of endogeneity bias. 
TABLE 8. GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS BETWEEN AUTOCRACY, 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE SIZE OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
Null Hypothesis Obs F-statistic P-value 
Direct Democracy does not Granger 
Cause the Size of the Informal Sector 
16 3.578* 0.060 
Size of the Informal Sector does not 
Granger Cause Direct Democracy 
16 1.418 0.300 
Autocracy does not Granger Cause the 
Size of the Informal Sector 
16 0.526 0.675 
Size of the Informal Sector does not 
Granger Cause Autocracy 
16 0.855 0. 855 
Autocracy does not Granger Cause 
Direct Democracy 
16 2.810 0.100 
Direct Democracy does not Granger 
Cause Autocracy 
16 1.231 0.354 
 
* - 10% significance level, **-5% significance level, ***- 1% significance level. 
 
The main testable assumptions are the following: (i) the higher the level of 
autocracy the smaller the size of the informal sector. (ii) the higher the level of direct 
democracy the larger the size of the informal sector. The results of all the regressions 
presented in table 9 show that the coefficients of the ciri_elecsd and p_autoc are both 
negative and significant. The negative coefficient on ciri_elecsd indicates that the greater 
the freedom to make political choices, the smaller the size of the informal sector. This 
means that greater/ (lower) direct democracy will lead to a significant decrease (increase) 
in the size of informal sector. Recall that for p_autoc, a higher index indicates a high 
degree of autocracy. Therefore the negative coefficient on p_autoc shows that an 
increase/ (decrease) in the degree of autocracy, reduces/(expands) the size of the informal 




























TABLE 9. RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSIONS 
 




























education  -0.032 
(0.036) 
Diagnostics   
R2 0.737 0.736 
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.578 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.016 0.016 
Durbin Watson Statistic 2.069 2.087 




* - 10% significance level, **-5% significance level, ***- 1% significance level. 
 
 The standard errors were adjusted using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors and covariance. Following the results, table 8 reports some key 
diagnostics which are the Goodness of Fit, Durbin Watson tests for autocorrelation and 
the Ramsey tests for model mis-specification. The coefficient of determination (R2) 
shows that the model explains 87.4%  of the data demonstrating that the model is a good 
fit. The Durbin Watson tests shows the absence of autocorrelation and from the Ramsey 
tests, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the correct specification is a linear 




Our paper attempts to examine the impact of direct democracy and autocracy on the size 
of the informal sector in Nepal. Our motivation is due to the fact that Nepal has 
experienced both types of regimes in its political history and has a huge informal sector. 
As a result, our paper set out to develop a theoretical model in order to link democracy 
and autocracy to the size of the informal sector. This was followed by an empirical 








Model (MIMIC). Finally, we used indices that measure the level of autocracy and direct 
democracy to test empirically the main predictions of our theoretical model.  
Using our theoretical model, we use taxes to capture direct democracy. We 
argue that in a direct democracy, a higher tax rate is indicative of the fact that the 
government cares less about agent decisions on the amount of public good provision. 
Consequently, the agent chooses to operate in the informal sector as a voice-out against 
the government.  We used monopoly rent on investment to capture autocracy. Our results 
show that the higher the level of autocracy, the lower the size of the informal sector 
because the agent has less capital stock to accumulate for production in both sectors. The 
size of the informal sector decreases by a greater magnitude relative to the formal sector 
because it depends on the latter for investment. 
The size of the informal sector in Nepal was estimated using the MIMIC model 
from 1991 to 2009. Our results show that average size of the informal sector over the 
period was 43.68% of GDP.  With these estimates we tested empirically the impact of 
democracy and autocracy on the size of informal sector. The results confirm the key 
predictions of our theoretical model which is that lower democracy increases the size of 
the informal sector while greater autocracy decreases the size of the informal sector. 
We take the view the informal sector is useful in developing countries because it 
provides an alternative market for the production of goods and services as well as a 
source of employment. However, a sustained increase in the size of the informal sector is 
likely to be detrimental to economic growth because the informal sector is cut-off from 
vital public services necessary for the development of small and medium enter prices 
such as access to capital, technology, high level skills and protection of property rights. 
Consequently, our results show that developing countries should introduce 
elements of direct democracy in order to increase participation of tax payers. This will 
contribute in reducing the size of the informal sector.  
Finally, our findings also highlight the need to strengthen state capacity as 
developing countries become increasingly democratic. The growth of the size of the 
informal sector is indicative of the fact that the state capacity is weak. Strengthening the 
quality of state institutions as developing countries steer increasingly towards democracy 
will help steer government towards choosing policies that will have broad appeal thereby 
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2 See Gerxhani (1999) 
3 Granger-causality tests were tested using 3 lags as the optimal lag length. The optimal lag length 
was chosen on the basis of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz  Criterion (SC). We 
use freedom of political choice as a proxy for the level of democracy because using the latter 
produced an optimal lag length of zero which prevented us from carrying out Granger causality 
tests. 
4 We use the  freedom of political choice as an indicator of democracy obtained from the Quality of 









Nepal were unavailable. The size of the informal sector comes from own estimates produced using 
the MIMIC model. This is discussed in section 7.2 
5 See Kutcha-Helbring, 2000 
6 See Olson, 1993 p.569 
7 Some proportion of tax revenue is used for public investment while the rest is used for 
government consumption. 
8 The construction of the estimates of the informal sector in Nepal is discussed in section 4. 
9 See Parente and Prescott, 1992 
10 This index is referred to as p_autoc which measures the degree of autocracy. This is discussed in 
detail in section 5.2 
11 This restriction can be relaxed. 
12 The other way is to fix the variance of the unobserved variable to one or some positive constant. 
13The study that inflation can also have a negative impact on the size of  the informal sector was 
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